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EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY 





We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-war without exogenous 
noise, in which players have the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt 
to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in which the player expending the greater 
resources wins. In equilibrium, contest effort concentrates on at most two adjacent states of 
the game, the "tipping states", which are determined by the contestants' relative strengths, 
their distances to final victory, and the discount factor. In these states battle outcomes are 
stochastic due to endogenous randomization. Both relative strength and closeness to victory 
increase the probability of winning the battle at hand. Patience reduces the role of distance in 
determining outcomes. 
Applications range from politics, economics and sports, to biology, where the equilibrium 
behavior finds empirical support: many species have developed mechanisms such as 
hierarchies or other organizational structures by which the allocation of prizes are governed 
by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation why. Compared to a 
single-stage conflict, such structures can reduce the overall resources that are dissipated 
among the group of players. 
JEL Code: D72, D74. 
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Final success or failure in a conﬂi c ti so f t e nt h er e s u l to ft h eo u t c o m e so f
a series of potential battles. An illustrative example is the decision making
process in many organizations. Resources, jobs and other goods that invol-
ve rents to individuals inside the organization are frequently allocated in a
process that has multiple decision stages. For instance, hiring decisions often
involve a contest between candidates in which a hiring committee makes a
decision and forwards this decision to another committee. This committee
approves to the initial decision and forwards the case further until a ﬁnal
decision stage is reached, or may return the case to the previous committee.
Candidates could expend eﬀo r tt r y i n gt oi n ﬂuence the decision process in
each stage, but if at all, typically serious eﬀorts are expended by the candi-
dates only in early stages of the decision process. Such multi-layered decision
processes obviously cause delay in decision making and this can be seen as
a cost. We will argue here that, compared to a single stage decision process
in which the rival players spend eﬀort in a single stage all-pay auction, the
multi-stage decision process can be advantageous as it may improve alloca-
tive eﬃciency and reduce eﬀort that is expended by rival contestants in the
conﬂict.
In more general terms we describe the multi-stage contest as a tug-of-
war. As a modeling device, the tug-of-war has a large number of applications
in diverse areas of science, including political science, economics, astronomy,
history and biology.1 It consists of a (possibly inﬁnite) sequence of battles
between two contestants who accumulate stage victories, and in which the
1To give a few examples: In politics, Whitford (2005) describes the struggle between the
president and legislature about the control of agencies as a tug-of-war. Yoo (2001) refers
to the relations between the US and North-Korea and Organski and Lust-Okar (1997) to
the struggle about the status of Jerusalem as cases of tug-of-war. According to Runciman
(1987), at the time of the Crusades, when various local rulers frequently attacked one
another, they sometimes succeeded in conquering a city or a fortiﬁcation, only to lose this,
or another, part of their territory to the same, or another, rival ruler later on. The conﬂict
between two rival rulers can be seen as a sequence of battles. They start at some status
quo in which each rules over a number of territories with fortiﬁed areas. They ﬁght each
other in battles, and each battle is concerned with one fortress or territory. In the sequence
of successes and failures, the fortresses or territories are destroyed or reallocated, and the
conﬂict continues until one of the rulers has lost all his fortresses or territories and is thus
ﬁnally defeated. If battle success alternates more or less evenly, then such a contest can go
on for a very long time, possibly even forever. The end comes only when one of the rulers
has been more successful than his rival suﬃciently often.
1contestant who ﬁrst accumulates a suﬃciently larger number of such victories
than his rival is awarded the prize for ﬁnal victory.2
To our knowledge, Harris and Vickers (1987) were the ﬁrst to look for-
mally at the tug-of-war. They analyse an R&D race as a tug-of-war in which
each single battle is determined as the outcome of a contest with noise. Such
exogenous noise makes the problem less tractable and has so far ruled out a
fully analytic description of the equilibrium. Budd, Harris and Vickers (1993)
apply a somewhat more complicated stochastic diﬀerential game approach to
a dynamic duopoly, seen as a tug-of-war involving a continuum of advertizing
or R&D battles that determine the ﬁrms’relative market positions. Using a
complementary pair of asymptotic expansions for extreme parameter values
and numerical simulations elsewhere, they isolate a number of eﬀects that
govern the process. Several of these appear in our analysis which, unlike
their framework, derives an analytical solution for the unique Markov per-
fect equilibrium. Morever, our analysis explicitly solves for equilibrium for
both symmetric and asymmetric environments.
The term ‘tug-of-war’ has also been used in biology. In the context of
within-group conﬂict among animals, subjects could struggle repeatedly.3 For
instance, the formation of hierarchies and their dynamic evolution occurs in
repeated battle contests. As Hemelrijk (2000) describes for several examp-
les, individuals may try to acquire a high rank, but the diﬀerentiation and
asymmetry that is created by this can also reduce future conﬂict. Winning
or losing a particular contest in a series of conﬂictual situations is known to
change future conﬂict behavior (Bergman et al. (2003), Beacham (2003) and
Hsu and Wolf (1999)). This may partially be the result of information about
own ﬁghting skills and the ﬁghting experience gained, but it may also arise
2According to Wikipedia the term tug-of-war refers to a rope pulling contest in which
two contestants (or groups) pull a rope in diﬀerent directions until one of the sides pulled
the rope (and the opponent group) across a certain limit. In more abstract terms, the
contest consists of a series of battles, where a battle victory of one player makes both
move one unit towards the winner’s preferred terminal state, and where one contestant
w i n st h ew a ri ft h ed i ﬀerence between the winner’s number of such battle victories exceeds
the other contestant’s number of battle victories by some absolute number.
3The term also refers to contests between diﬀerent species. Ehrenberg and McGrath
(2004) refer to the interaction of microtubule motors, Larsson, Beignon and Bhardwaj
(2004) and Zhou et al. (2004) refer to the interaction between viruses and the dendritic
cells or other parts of the immune system as tugs of war. Tibbetts and Reeve (2000)
consider the role of the amount of reproductive sharing within a group for the likelihood
of within-group conﬂict among the social wasp Polistes dominulus.
2from the change in strategic position with respect to future conﬂict about
rank, territory, access to food, or opportunities to reproduce.
Evidence from biology and political science shows that violent conﬂict
often does not take place, or, at least, the intensity of a conﬂict varies si-
gniﬁcantly as a function of the conﬂicting parties’ actual strengths, previous
experience, and the strategic symmetry or asymmetry of the particular si-
tuation in terms of territorial or other advantages. Parker and Rubenstein
(1981) and Hammerstein (1981) emphasize the role of asymmetry in determi-
ning whether a conﬂictual situation turns into a resource wasteful or violent
conﬂict. Diﬀerent advantages and disadvantages may determine the over-
all asymmetry of a conﬂictual situation, and counterbalance or add to each
other. Schaub (1995) describes the conﬂict over food that occurs between
long-tailed macaque females. Diﬀerences in strength and in the distances
between the animals and the location of the food govern their behavior. Su-
perior strength or dominance of one contestant can be compensated by a
greater distance she has to the location of the food. Relative strength, to-
gether with the actual payoﬀs from winning determine contestants’ stakes
at any given stage of a tug-of-war and determine the degree of asymmetry
between the rival players.
We examine how the players’ respective ﬁghting abilities, rewards from
ﬁnal victory, and the distances in terms of the required battle win diﬀerential
to achieve victory interact to determine Markov perfect equilibrium behavior
in the tug-of-war. For notational convenience we concentrate on the asymme-
try in the valuations of the ﬁnal prize and assume equal ﬁghting ability, but
as will be shown this is equivalent to the more general case with asymmetric
valuations of the prize and asymmetric ﬁghting abilities. We show that the
contest eﬀort that is dissipated in total and over all battle periods crucial-
ly depends on the starting point of the tug-of-war, and, for many starting
points, is negligible, even if the asymmetry in the starting conditions is very
limited. Hence, the multi-battle structure in a tug-of-war reduces the amount
of resources that is dissipated in the contest, compared to a single all-pay
auction, which has been studied by Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Ko-
venock and deVries (1993, 1996) for the case of complete information and
by Amann and Leininger (1995, 1996), Krishna and Morgan (1997), Kura
(1999), Moldovanu and Sela (2001) and Gavious, Moldovanu and Sela (2002)
in the context of incomplete information.4
4For further applications of the all-pay auction see Arbatskaya (2003), Baik, Kim and
3Our results may contribute to explaining why mechanisms such as hierar-
chies or other organizational structures have evolved by which the allocation
of prizes is governed by a multi-stage conﬂict.5 Such structures may delay the
allocation of a given prize, compared to a single stage conﬂict, but can con-
siderably reduce the overall resources that are dissipated among the group
of players. Compared to a standard all-pay auction, a tug-of-war that is not
rigged in favor of one of the players also improves allocative eﬃciency; the
probability with which the prize is awarded to the player who values it more
highly is higher in the tug-of-war than in the standard all-pay auction.
I nt h en e x ts e c t i o nw eo u t l i n et h es t r u c t u r eo ft h et u g - o f - w a ra n dc h a -
racterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium. In section 3 we discuss the
eﬃciency properties of the tug-of-war and compare it with the all-pay aucti-
on. Section 4 concludes.
2 The analytics of the tug-of-war
A tug-of-war is a multi-stage game with a potentially inﬁnite horizon which
is characterized by the following elements. The set of players is {A,B}.T h e
set of states of the war is given by a ﬁnite ordered grid of m +1points
M ≡ {0,1,...m} in R1. The tug-of-war begins at time t = 1 with players
in the intitial state j(1) = mA, 0 <m A <m , which may either be chosen
by nature, or may be a feature of the institutional design. In each period
t =1 ,2,3... a battle takes place between the players in which A (resp. B)
expends eﬀort at (resp. bt). A victory by player A (B) in state i at time t
moves the war to state i−1( i+1)at time t+1. The state in period t+1is
therefore j(t +1 )=mA + nBt − nAt,w h e r enAt and nBt denote respectively,
Na (2001), Baye, Kovenock and De Vries (2005), Che and Gale (1998, 2003), Ellingsen
(1991), Kaplan, Luski and Wettstein (2003), Konrad (2004), Moldovanu and Sela (2004),
and Sahuguet and Persico (2005).
5There are, of course, other explanations for hierarchies more generally, which, however,
focus on diﬀerent aspects of a hierarchy (see, e.g., the survey in Radner 1992). Radner
(1993) for instance, considers a problem of eﬃcient information aggregation, asking what is
the eﬃcient decision tree. Closer to the issue of allocation of goods in a conﬂict, Wärneryd
(1998) and Müller and Wärneryd (2001) consider distributional conﬂict between rival
groups followed by distributional conﬂict within the winning group as a type of hierarchical
conﬂict. Both these approaches focus on the "tree-ör "pyramidproperty of hierarchies that
reduces the number of players when moving to the top, whereas our approach does not use
this property. We consider only two contestants throughout and focus on the sequential,
repeated nature of decision process.
4the number of battle victories that A and B have accumulated by the end
of period t. This continues as long as the war stays in some interior state
j ∈ Mint ≡ {1,2,...,(m−1)}. The war ends when one of the players achieves
ﬁnal victory by driving the state to his favored terminal state, j =0and
j = m,f o rp l a y e rA and B respectively. A prize (for ﬁnal victory) of size ZA
is awarded to A if the terminal state j =0is reached and, alternatively, a
prize of ZB is awarded to B if the terminal state j = m is reached. Without
loss of generality we assume that ZA ≥ ZB. Figure 1 depicts the set of states.
states j 




Player A’s (B’s) period t payoﬀ πA(at,j(t)) (πB(bt,j(t))) is assumed to
equal ZA (ZB) if player A (B) is awarded the prize in that period, and
−at (−bt)i ft is a period in which eﬀort is expended.6 We assume that
each player maximizes the expected discounted sum of his per-period payoﬀs.
Throughout we assume that 0 <δ<1 denotes the common, time invariant,
discount factor.7
The assumption that the cost of eﬀort is simply measured by the eﬀort
itself is for notational simplicity only. Since a player’s preference over income
streams is invariant with respect to a positive aﬃne transformation of utility,
if player A (B) has a constant unit cost of eﬀort cA (cB) we may normalize
utility by dividing by cA (cB) to obtain a new utility function representing
the same preferences in which the unit cost of eﬀort is 1 but player A (B) has
ap r i z ev a l u eZA/cA (ZB/cB). Therefore, our model with asymmetric prizes
can be interpreted as one with both asymmetric prizes and ﬁghting abilities.
Each single battle in the tug-of-war is a simultaneous move all-pay auc-
tion with complete information. A player’s action in each period in which
the state is interior is his eﬀort, at ∈ [0,K] and bt ∈ [0,K],f o rA and B,
6Since the per-period payoﬀs do not depend directly on time, we have dropped a time
index.
7It is straightforward to extend our results to cases in which players have diﬀerent,
time invariant discount factors δA and δB.
5respectively, where K ≥ ZA.8 The player who spends the higher eﬀort in a
period wins the battle. We choose a deterministic tie-breaking rule for the
case in which both players choose the same eﬀort, by which the ”advantaged”
player wins. Given m, ZA, ZB and δ, we say that player A is advantaged in
state j if δ
jZA >δ
m−jZB,a n dB is advantaged if δ
jZA ≤ δ
m−jZB.W ed e ﬁne
j0 =m i n {j ∈ Mint ¯ ¯δ
jZA ≤ δ
m−jZB} w h e r et h i si sn o n - e m p t y ,a n dj0 = m
otherwise: player B is advantaged for j ∈ Mint such that j ≥ j0 and A is
advantaged otherwise.
If m =2and mA =1 , the tug-of-war reduces to the well-known case of
the standard all-pay auction with complete information at time t =1 ,a si n
Hillman and Riley (1989), Ellingsen (1991) or Baye, Kovenock and deVries
(1996). In this case, one single battle takes place at state j = mA =1 .T h e
process moves from this state in period 1 to j =0or to j =2at the beginning
of period 2, and the prize is handed over to A or B, respectively. Accordingly,
the contest at period t =1in state j =1is over a prize that has a present
value of δZA and δZB for A and B, respectively, and the payoﬀs in the unique
equilibrium of this game (which are in nondegenerate mixed strategies) are
δ(ZA −ZB) for A and zero for B. In what follows, we consider the case with
m>2.
For each period t, if a terminal state has not yet been reached by the
beginning of the period, players simultaneously choose eﬀorts with common
knowledge of the initial state mA and the full history of eﬀort choices, denoted
as (at−1,bt−1) ≡ ((a1,...,at−1), (b1,...,bt−1)). Players also know the current
state j(t) of the war and the state in any past period j(τ), τ<t .W ed e ﬁne
jt =( j(1),j(2),...j(t)),w h e r ej(1) = mA. Hence, we will summarize the
history at time t along any path which has not yet hit a terminal state by
ht =( at−1,bt−1,jt). We will call such a path a non-terminal period t history
and will denote the set of such histories by Ht. A history of the game that
generates a path that reaches a terminal state at precisely period t is termed
a terminal period t history. Denote the set of terminal period t histories by
Tt,a n dt h es e to f(at−1,bt−1) generating elements of Tt by Tt
e.
If for an inﬁnite sequence of eﬀort choices, a =( a1,a 2,...) and b =
(b1,b 2,...) no terminal state is reached in ﬁnite time, we will call the cor-
responding history h∞ =( a,b,j) a non-terminal history and denote the set
8This upper limit makes the set of possible eﬀort choices compact, but does not lead
to a restriction that could be binding in any equilibrium, as an eﬀort choice larger than
ZA in some period is strictly dominated by a choice of eﬀort of zero in this and all future
periods.
6of such histories as H∞.
Given these constructions, we deﬁne a behavior strategy σl for player
l ∈ {A,B} as a sequence of mappings σl(ht):Ht → Σ[0,K],t h a ts p e c i ﬁes for
every period t and non-terminal history ht an element of the set of probabi-
lity distributions over the feasible eﬀort levels [0,K].E a c hb e h a v i o rs t r a t e g y
proﬁle σ =( σA,σ B) generates for each t a probability distribution over his-
tories in the set
S
τ≤t Tτ ∪ Ht. It also generates a probability distribution
over the set of all feasible paths of the game,
S∞
τ=1 Tτ ∪ H∞.
Since we assume that each player’s payoﬀ for the tug-of-war is the expec-
t e dd i s c o u n t e ds u mo fh i sp e r - p e r i o dp a y o ﬀs, the payoﬀ for player A from a




Eσ(πA(a˜ t−1,b˜ t−1,j˜ t)) where ˜ t is the hitting time at which a terminal state is
ﬁrst reached.9 If a terminal state is never reached, ˜ t = ∞. Note that for a
given sequence of actions (a˜ t−1 b˜ t−1), ˜ t arises deterministically, according to
the non-random transition rule embodied in the all-pay auction, so that the
randomness of ˜ t is generated entirely by the non-degenerate nature of the
probability distributions chosen by the behavioral strategies. If ht+1 =( at
bt,jt+1) ∈ Tt+1
e denotes a sequence of eﬀorts that leads to a terminal state at
precisely period ˜ t = t +1 , then, the payoﬀsf o rA and B are
πA((at,bt,jt+1)) =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
















⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨











i−1ai if j(t +1 )=0 .
(2)
9We adopt a notational convention throughout this paper that the action set available
to each player in a terminal state is the eﬀort level zero, so that for any hitting time ˜ t,
a˜ t = b˜ t =0 . Hence, in these states πA(at,j) and πB(bt,j) include only the prize awarded




πA(a˜ t−1,b˜ t−1,j˜ t).
7If for an inﬁnite sequence of eﬀort choices, a =( a1,a 2,...) and b =( b1,b 2,...)










F o rag i v e nb e h a v i o rs t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle σ =( σA,σ B) each player’s payoﬀ in the
tug-of-war can be derived from calculating the expected sum of discounted
per period payoﬀs generated by the probability distribution over histories in
the set
S∞
τ=1 Tτ ∪H∞.M o r e o v e r ,f o ra n yt and ht ∈ Ht,o n em a yd e ﬁne each
player’s expected discounted value of future per-period payoﬀs (discounted
back to time t) conditional on the history ht by deriving the conditional
distribution induced byσ|ht over
S∞
τ=t+1 Tτ ∪ H∞.W es h a l lr e f e rt ot h i sa s




s−tπA(as,j(s))). Note that this has netted out any expenditures
a c c r u e do nt h eh i s t o r yht.
Since the players’ objective functions are additively separable in the per-
period (time invariant) payoﬀs and transitions probabilities depend only upon
the current state and actions, continuation payoﬀs from any sequence of
current and future action proﬁles depend on past histories only through the
current state j. It therefore seems natural to restrict attention to Markov
strategies that depend only on the current state j and examine the set of
Markov perfect equilibria. Indeed, this partition of histories is that obtained
from the more formal analysis of the determination of the Markov partition
in Maskin and Tirole (2001). For any t, we may partition past (non-terminal)
histories in Ht by the period t state j(t), inducing a partition Ht(·), and deﬁne
the collection of partitions, H(·) ≡ {Ht(·)}∞
t=1. It can be demonstrated that in
our game the vector of collections (HA(·),HB(·)) = (H(·),H(·)) is the unique
maximally coarse consistent collection (the Markov collection of partitions) in
the sense of Maskin and Tirole (2001, p. 201). For any time t, the current state
j(t) therefore constitutes what they call the payoﬀ-relevant history.S i n c e
our game is stationary, we may partition the set of all ﬁnite non-terminal
histories by the same state variables, j ∈ Mint ≡ {1,2,...(m−1)},r e m o v i n g
any dependence of the partition on the time t. We label this partition {j(t)=
i}i∈Mint.T h i si st h estationary partition deﬁned by Maskin-Tirole, (2001, p.
203).
In the continuation, we restrict attention to (stationary) Markov strate-
gies measurable with respect to the payoﬀ relevant history determined by
8the stationary partition {j(t)=i}i∈Mint. A stationary Markov strategy σl
for player l ∈ {A,B} is a mapping σl(j):Mint → Σ[0,K],t h a ts p e c i ﬁes for
every interior state j a probability distribution over the set of feasible ef-
fort levels [0,K]. If in the continuation game starting in period t and state
j, σ =( σA,σ B) is played, then the continuation value for player i at t is
denoted as vi(σ|j) and can be calculated as the discounted sum of future
expected period payoﬀs in a well-deﬁned manner similar to that described
above.
In this context we are interested in deriving the set of Markov perfect
equilibria; that is a pair of Markov strategies that constitute mutually best
responses for all feasible histories. In Propositions 1-3 below we demonstrate
that the tug-of-war has a unique Markov perfect equilibrium for any combi-
nation of mA,m,Z A,Z B and δ.
Before stating these propositions, it is useful to derive some simple proper-
ties that must hold in any Markov perfect equilibrium of our model. Suppose
σ∗ =( σ∗
A,σ∗
B) is a Markov perfect equilibrium and denote player i’s continua-
tion value in state j under σ∗ by vi(σ∗ |j)=vi(j). Subgame perfection and
stationarity imply that competition in any state j, j ∈ {1,2,...m − 1},m a y
be viewed as an all-pay auction with prize zA(j)=δvA(j−1)−δvA(j+1)for
player A and zB(j)=δvB(j +1 )− δvB(j − 1) for player B. In equilibrium,
the continuation value to player l of being in state j at time t is equal to the
sum of the value of conceeding the prize without a ﬁght (and thereby moving
one state away from the player’s desired terminal state) and the value of
engaging in an all-pay auction with prizes zA(j)=δvA(j − 1) − δvA(j +1 )
for player A and zB(j)=δvB(j +1 )− δvB(j − 1) for player B. An imme-
diate consequence of the characterization of the unique equilibrium in the
two-player all-pay auction with complete information (see Hillman and Riley
(1989) and Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (1996)) is that local stategies are
uniquely determined and the continuation value for the two players in any
state j ∈ {1,...m − 1} at any time t is
vA(j)=δvA(j +1 )+m a x ( 0 ,z A(j) − zB(j)) = δvA(j +1 ) +
+max(0,δ[(vA(j − 1) − vA(j +1 ) )− (vB(j +1 )− vB(j − 1))]) (3)
and
vB(j)=δvB(j − 1) + max(0,z B(j) − zA(j)) = δvB(j − 1)+
+max(0,δ[(vB(j +1 )− vB(j − 1)) − (vA(j − 1) − vA(j +1 ) ) ] ) . (4)






Note that the ﬁrst summand in (5) and (6) is the discounted value of losing
the contest at j and the second summand in each of these expressions is
the expected gain arising from the contest at j. For at least one player this
gain will be zero and for the other player it will be non-negative and strictly
positive as long as J(j − 1) 6= J(j +1 ) ,w h e r eJ(l) ≡ vA(l)+vB(l) is the
joint present value of being in state l.
Three immediate implications of the above construction are
(i) zA(j) − zB(j) ≥ 0 if and only if J(j − 1) − J(j +1 )≥ 0 with strict
inequality in one if and only if in the other.
(ii) zA(j)−zB(j) ≥ 0 if and only if vB(j)=δvB(j−1) and zA(j)−zB(j) ≤ 0
if and only if vA(j)=δvA(j +1 ) .
(iii) If zA(j)−zB(j) ≥ 0 then vA(j)=δ[vA(j −1)+vB(j −1))−vB(j +1)],
and if zA(j)−zB(j) ≤ 0 then vB(j)=δ[vA(j+1)+vB(j+1))−vA(j−1)].
By assumption 0 and m are terminal states so that vA(0) = ZA ≥ ZB =
vB(m) and vA(m)=vB(0) = 0. Moreover, since player A can only receive a
positive payoﬀ in the state 0,p l a y e rB can only receive a positive payoﬀ in the
state m, and both players have available the opportunity to always expend
zero eﬀort, in any Markov perfect equilibrium the following inequalities hold
for all j:
0 ≤ vA(j) ≤ δ
jZA (7)






10We can now prove the following







Then a unique Markov perfect equilibrium exists which is characterized as
follows:
For all interior states j/ ∈ {j0 − 1,j 0},t h ee q u i l i b r i u me ﬀort choices are
a(j)=b(j)=0 .O n l ya tj0−1 and j0 does a battle with a positive probability
of stricty positive eﬀort choices take place. Payoﬀsf o rA in the continuation
game at j are δ
jZA for j<j 0−1, 1
(1−δ2)[δ
j0−1ZA−δ
m−(j0−1)ZB] for j = j0−1,
and 0 for j ≥ j0;p a y o ﬀsf o rB are δ




for j = j0 and 0 for j ≤ j0 − 1.
Proof. We consider existence here and relegate the proof of uniqueness
to the Appendix. We consider the following candidate equilibrium: For all
interior states j/ ∈ {j0−1,j 0},t h ee ﬀort choices are a(j)=b(j)=0 .A tj0−1
and j0 players choose eﬀorts according to cumulative distribution functions
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m−(j0−1)ZB].( 1 5 )
Note ﬁrst that this equilibrium candidate has the properties described in
Proposition 1. Players’ continuation values can be stated as functions of the










m−(j0−1)ZB] for j = j0 − 1












j0ZA] for j = j0
0 for j ≤ j0 − 1.
(17)
T h e s ec o n s t i t u t et h ep a y o ﬀs stated in the proposition. For 0 <j<j 0 − 1,
player A wins the next j battles without any eﬀort. This takes j periods and
explains why the value of the ﬁnal prize must be discounted to δ
jZA.A l s o ,
B does not expend eﬀort in these j battles and ﬁnally loses after j battles.
Hence, B’s payoﬀ is equal to zero. For m>j>j 0,p l a y e r sA and B simply
switch roles.
Turn now to the states j0 − 1 and j0 as in Figure 2. We call these states
"tipping states", because of their pivotal role in determining the outcome
of the contest. Consider j0 − 1.F r o mt h e r e ,i fA wins, the game moves to
j0 − 2 with continuation values vA(j0 − 2) = δ
j0−2ZA and vB(j0 − 2) = 0.
If B wins, the game moves to j0 with continuation values vA(j0)=0and
vB(j0). Assuming that δ
j0−2ZA >v B(j0) (which can be conﬁrmed later),
and applying the results on the standard all-pay auction, the continuation
12values are
vA(j0 − 1) = zA(j0 − 1) − zB(j0 − 1) = δ[δ
j0−2ZA − vB(j0)] (18)
and vB(j0 − 1) = 0, where zA(j0 − 1) and zB(j0 − 1) denote the prizes that
A and B respectively attribute to winning the battle at j0 − 1,g i v e nt h e
continuation of the game as described in the candidate equilibrium. Similarly,
at j0,i fA wins, the game moves to j0−1 with continuation values vA(j0−1)
as in (18) and vB(j0 − 1) = 0.I fB wins, the game moves to j0 +1with
continuation values vA(j0 +1)=0and vB(j0 +1)=δ
m−(j0+1)ZB. This yields
a continuation value for player B of
vB(j0)=zB(j0) − zA(j0)=δ[δ
m−(j0+1)ZB − vA(j0 − 1)],( 1 9 )
and vA(j0)=0 . The solution to this system of equations yields the posi-
tive equilibrium values in the middle lines of (16) and (17), and the zero
continuation value in the respective state for the other player.
It remains to be shown that the choices described in the candidate equi-
librium indeed describe equilibrium behavior. The one-stage deviation prin-
ciple applies here.10 The continuation values (16) and (17) can be used to
consider one-stage deviations for A and for B.
Ad e v i a t i o nb0(j) > 0 at a state 0 <j<j 0 − 1 changes the path from
moving to j−1 in the next period to j+1. However, vB(j−1) = vB(j+1) = 0.
Hence, this deviation reduces B’s payoﬀ by b0(j) compared to b(j)=0 .A
deviation b0(j) > 0 at j>j 0 does not change the state in t +1compared to
b(j)=0in the candidate equilibrium, due to the tiebreaking rule employed.
The deviation reduces B’s payoﬀ by b0(j) compared to b(j)=0 .A ne q u i v a l e n t
logic applies for a(j) at states j/ ∈ {j0 − 1,j 0}.
Turn now to the state j0. In the candidate equilibrium, in state j0 con-




actions in the equilibrium support for A at j0 yield the same expected payoﬀ
equal to Gj0(x)δvA(j0 − 1) + (1 − Gj0(x))0 − x =0 . A possible one-stage
deviation for A at j0 is an a0(j0) > δ
(1−δ2)[δ
j0−1ZA − δ
m−(j0−1)ZB].C o m p a r e d
10To conﬁrm this it is suﬃcient to show that the condition of continuity at inﬁnity is
fulﬁlled for this game. We may then apply Theorem 4.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1993).
This condition requires that the supremum of the payoﬀ diﬀerence that can emerge from
strategies that diﬀer after period t converges to zero as t →∞ . However, a supremum for
this is δ
t[Zi + 1
1−δK] for i = A,B, and this converges to zero as t →∞ .
13to the action a(j0)= δ
(1−δ2)[δ
j0−1ZA − δ
m−(j0−1)ZB] that is inside A’s equili-
brium support, this also leads to state j0−1, but costs the additional amount
a0(j0) − a(j0) > 0. The deviation is therefore not proﬁtable for A.T h es a m e
type of argument applies for b(j0).
A similar argument applies to the state j0−1. In the candidate equilibri-




j0ZA)]. All actions in the equilibrium support for A at j0 − 1 yield the sa-




m−(j0−1)ZB]=vA(j0 − 1).11 A possible one-stage deviation
for A at j0 − 1 is an a0(j0 − 1) > δ
(1−δ2)[δ
m−j0ZB − δ
j0ZA]. Compared to the
action a(j0 − 1) = δ
(1−δ2)[δ
m−j0ZB − δ
j0ZA] that is the upper bound of A’s
equilibrium support, this also leads to state j0 − 2, but costs the additional
amount a0(j0 −1)−a(j0 −1) > 0. The deviation is not proﬁtable for A.T h e
same type of argument applies for b(j0 − 1).
Intuitively, outside of the states j0 −1 and j0, one of the players is indif-
ferent between winning and losing the component contest. For instance, in
the state j0 − 2, the best that player B could achieve by winning the next
component contest is to enter the state j0−1 at which B’s continuation value
is still zero and smaller than player A’s continuation value. As B does not
gain anything from reaching j0 − 1, B should not spend any eﬀort trying to
reach this state. But if B does not spend eﬀort to win, it is easy for A to
win.
The states j0 − 1 and j0 are diﬀerent. Battle victory or defeat at one of
these points leads to diﬀerent continuation games and allocates a considerable
rent between A and B. This makes competition particularly strong at these
states. We call these states "tipping states"because success of an advantaged
player at each of these two states "tips"the game so that victory is obtained
without further eﬀort. A loss by the advantaged player throws the system
back into a competitive state where the player becomes disadvantaged.
Proposition 1 also shows that the allocation of a prize in a tug-of-war
leads to a seemingly peaceful outcome whenever the conﬂict starts in a state
other than a tipping state. This will be important for drawing conclusions
in section 3 about the eﬃciency properties of a tug-of-war as an allocation
11More formally, all actions in the support of A’s equilibrium local strategy that are not
mass points of B’s local strategy yield the same expected payoﬀ.S i n c eB has a mass point
at zero, this does not hold at a =0 ,b u tf o re v e r ya in a neigborhood above zero.
14mechanism.
Proposition 1 does not consider all possible parameter cases. Before tur-
ning to the remaining cases, note that the case j0 =1cannot emerge, as this
requires δZA <δ
m−1ZB, and this contradicts ZA ≥ ZB for m>2.H o w e v e r ,
player A’s dominance could be suﬃciently large that no interior j0 exists that
has the properties deﬁned in Proposition 1. This leads to
Proposition 2 Suppose that δ
m−1ZA >δ Z B. Then a unique Markov perfect
equilibrium exists with vB(j)=0and vA(j)=δ
jZA for all j ∈ {1,...,m−2},
and vA(m − 1) = δ
m−1ZA − δZB and vB(m − 1) = 0 at j = m − 1.
Proof. We show that the following eﬀort choices constitute an equilibrium
and yield the payoﬀs described in the proposition. Uniqueness follows the
argument in the Appendix.
Eﬀort is a(j)=b(j)=0for all j ∈ Mint\{m−1} and for j = m−1 eﬀorts
are chosen according to the following cumulative distribution functions:
Fm−1(a)=
½ a







δm−1ZA) for b∈ [0,δZ B]
1 for b>δZB.
(21)
Note that this behavior yields the payoﬀs that are characterized in Propositi-
on 2. For states j =1 ,2,...,(m−2), A wins after j further battles, and none
of the players expends eﬀort. This conﬁrms vA(j)=δ
jZA and vB(j)=0for
all j =1 ,...m− 2.F o rj = m, the payoﬀsa r evA(m)=0and vB(m)=ZB.
Finally, for j = m−1, given the mixed strategies described by (20) and (21),
the payoﬀsa r evA(m − 1) = δ
m−1ZA >δ Z B and vB(m − 1) = 0.
Now we conﬁrm that the eﬀort choices in the candidate equilibrium are
indeed mutually optimal replies. For interior states j<m− 1,ad e v i a t i o n
b0(j) > 0 makes B win the battle, instead of A. It leads to j +1 ,i n s t e a d
of j − 1, but vB(j +1 )=vB(j − 1) = 0. Hence, this deviation reduces B’s
payoﬀ by b0(j) compared to b(j)=0 .F o rA,f o rj<m − 1, contestant
A reaches j =0along the shortest possible series of battle victories and
does not spend any eﬀort. Any positive eﬀort can therefore only decrease
A’s payoﬀ.F o rj = m − 1, t h eb a t t l ee i t h e rl e a d st oj = m where B ﬁnally
wins the prize, or to j = m−2. The values the players attribute to reaching
these states are vA(m)=0 , vB(m)=ZB,a n dvA(m − 2) = δ
m−2ZA and
15vB(m − 2) = 0. Using the results in Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye,
Kovenock and deVries (1996) on a complete information all-pay auction with
prizes δ[δ
m−2ZA − 0] = δ
m−1ZA for A and δ[ZB − 0] = δZB for B, it is
conﬁrmed that (20) and (21) describe the unique equilibrium cumulative
distribution functions of eﬀort for this all-pay auction.
Proposition 2 shows that a very strong player has a positive continuation
value regardless of the interior state in which the tug-of-war starts and wins
with probability 1 without expending eﬀort for every interior state except
j = m − 1.
So far we have ruled out the case of equality of continuation values at
interior states, and we turn to this case now which exhausts the set of possible
cases.
Proposition 3 The tug-of-war with δ
j0ZA = δ
(m−j0)ZB ≡ Z for some j0 ∈
{2,...(m−1)} has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which players spend
a(j)=b(j)=0in all interior states j 6= j0. They choose eﬀorts a(j) and
b(j) at j = j0 from the same uniform distribution on the range [0,Z].P a y o ﬀs
are vA(j)=δ
jZA and vB(j)=0for j<j 0, vA(j)=0and vB(j)=δ
m−jZB
for j>j 0 and vA(j)=vB(j)=0for j = j0.
Proof. We again construct an equilibrium to demonstrate existence. Un-
iqueness follows from arguments similar to those appearing in the Appendix.
In the candidate equilibrium each contestant expends zero eﬀort at any




Z for x ∈ [0,Z]
1 for x>Z . (22)
At j = j0 the expected eﬀort of each player equals Z/2,a n de a c hw i n st h i s
battle with a probability of 1/2 and, in this case, eventually wins the overall
contest j0 − 1 or (m − j0) − 1 periods later, respectively, without spending
any further eﬀort. This determines the continuation values in the candidate
equilibrium. These continuation values are
vA = vB =0 if j = j0
vA = δ
jZA and vB =0 if j<j 0
vA =0and vB = δ
m−jZB if j>j 0.
(23)
It remains to show that the candidate equilibrium describes mutually
optimal replies. Consider one-stage deviations for A and B for some state
16j<j 0.Ac h o i c ea0(j) > 0 will not change the equilibrium outcome in the
battle in this period and hence will simply reduce A’s payoﬀ by a0(j).A
choice b0(j) > 0 will make B win. If j<j 0 − 1, following the candidate
equilibrium A will simply win a series of battles until ﬁnal victory occurs.
Hence, b0(j) > 0 reduces B’s payoﬀ by this same amount b0(0) of eﬀort. If
j = j0 − 1, B’s battle victory will lead to j = j0, and candidate equilibrium
play from here on will yield a payoﬀ equal to zero to B. Accordingly, the
deviation b0(j) > 0 yields a reduction of B’s payoﬀ by this same amount.
Consider one-stage deviations for A and B in some state j>j 0.T h es a m e
line of argument applies, with A and B switching roles. Finally, consider
one-stage deviations for A and B at j = j0.A n ys u c hd e v i a t i o nf o rA must
be a choice a0(j) >Z .C o m p a r e dt oa(j)=Z, this choice makes A win with
t h es a m ep r o b a b i l i t y1, but yields a reduction in A’s payoﬀ by a0(j) − Z,
compared to a(j)=Z. The same argument applies for deviations by B at
this state.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. The two contestants enter
into a very strong ﬁght whenever they reach the state j = j0. In this state
they are perfectly symmetric and they anticipate that the winner of the battle
in this state moves straight to ﬁnal victory. In the battle that takes place in
this case, they dissipate the maximum feasible rent from winning this battle.
This maximum rent is what they get if they can move from there through
a series of uncontested battles to ﬁnal victory. Once one of the contestants,
say A, has acquired some advantage in the sense that the contest has moved
to j<j 0,t h eo n l yw a yf o rB to reach victory passes through the state with
j = j0. As all rent is dissipated in the contest that takes place there, B
is simply not willing to spend any eﬀo r tt om o v et h ec o n t e s tt ot h a ts t a t e .
Hence, the considerable eﬀort that is spent at the point at which the tug-of-
war becomes symmetric in terms of the prizes that are at stake for the two
contestants prevents the contestant who is lagging behind in terms of battle
victories from spending positive eﬀort.
Discounting played two important roles in our analysis. First, discounting
leads to payoﬀ functions that are continuous at inﬁnity, allowing the applica-
tion of the one-stage deviation principle, which greatly facilitates our proofs.
Moreover, discounting is essential in giving a meaningful role to the distance
to the state with ﬁnal victory. The following holds:
Proposition 4 For a given value of
ZA
ZB > 1, the tipping state j0 is an incre-
asing step function of δ. Moreover, as δ → 1, A wins the tug-of-war without
17eﬀort starting from any state j<m− 1.
Proof. The tipping state j0 is by deﬁnition the smallest state j for which
player B is advantaged: j0 =m i n {j ∈ Mint ¯ ¯δ
jZA ≤ δ
m−jZB} when this set is
non-empty, and j0 = m otherwise. For δ>0, the inequality δ
jZA ≤ δ
m−jZB
is equivalent to δ
2j−mZA ≤ ZB.S i n c em ≥ 3,f o rδ suﬃcently close to zero the
inequality is clearly satisﬁed for j = m − 1, so that j0 is interior. Moreover,
since δ
2j−m ≥ 1 for j ≤ m
2 ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tj0 > m
2 . As δ → 1,t h e
inequality is violated at all interior states, even at j = m − 1. In this case,
by deﬁniton j0 = m, and from Proposition 2 player A wins the war from
any state j<m− 1.F o ra n y0 <δ<1,δ
2j−mZA ≤ ZB is equivalent to




logδ , so that j0 is the smallest index j satisfying the inequality.
Since the left hand side of this inequality is positive, and both the numerator
and denominator of the right hand side are negative, as δ increases, the
right hand side monotonically increases, eventually diverging to ∞ as δ → 1.
Hence, as δ increases, the smallest index j satisfying the inequality must
increase in steps until it hits m.
As the discount factor increases, relative prize value or player strength
plays a greater role in the determination of the outcome than distance. For
any given value of
ZB
ZA < 1,a sδ increases the tipping state j0 moves in discrete
jumps towards m. Player A may suﬀer a greater distance disadvantage and
still win the prize with certainty.
3 Expenditure, allocative eﬃciency and the
cost of delay
The tug-of-war with m>2 resolves the allocation problem along a sequence
of states, where a violent battle may, but need not take place at each state.
Only in the tipping states is positive eﬀort expended with positive probability.
Once the process leaves the tipping states, the war moves to a terminal state,
without further eﬀort being expended. A tug-of-war that starts in a tipping
state will therefore be called "violent". A tug-of-war that starts outside a
tipping state will be called "peaceful".
Compared to the standard all-pay auction, the tug-of-war could be inter-
preted as an institution that saves cost of eﬀort in the problem of allocating a
prize between rivals who are prepared to expend resources in ﬁghting for the
18prize. Suppose for instance that ZA and ZB are independent random draws
from a continuous distribution with support [0,κ],w h e r eκ<K .Suppose
that these values are known to the contestants but are not observable by the
designer of the institution at the time that it must be implemented. Consider
the following tug-of-war as an anonymous mechanism in the case in which
m is an even number, so that m
2 is integer valued. Start the tug-of-war in
the symmetric state m
2 and assume, as we have throughout, that player A
attempts to move the state to j =0and player B attempts to move the
state to j = m. Then the following result derives the probability of peaceful
resolution:
Proposition 5 Let Γ(g) be the continuous cumulative distribution function
of g ≡ ZA/ZB,w i t hs u p p o r t[0,∞]. The allocation is peaceful in the Markov




(1 − Γ( 1
δ2))) = 1.
Proof. For a proof we show that Γ(δ
2)+(1−Γ( 1
δ2)) is the probability that
the symmetric state m/2 is not a tipping state. Suppose that g> 1
δ2.T h e n




2 +1)ZB. Hence, j0 − 1 > m
2 .B yP r o p o s i t i o n s
1-3 this implies that the tug-of-war that starts in m/2 consecutively moves to
j =0with no eﬀort being expended. Let g<δ
2.T h e nZA <Z B. Applying the
results in Propositions 1-3 with A and B and j =0and j = m switching roles
shows that the tug-of-war that starts in m/2 moves to j = m with no eﬀort
being expended. Suppose now that g ∈ (1, 1
δ2).I nt h i sc a s ej0 − 1=m/2.
Accordingly, a battle with positive expected eﬀorts takes place at m/2 if
δ
m
2 +1ZA 6= δ
m−(m
2 +1)ZB. No expected eﬀo r ti se x p e n d e di nt h i sc a s eo n l yi f
δ
m
2 +1ZA = δ
m−(m





2 +1)ZB holds has a measure of zero. A similar argument applies for
g ∈ (δ
2,1),a g a i nw i t hA and B and j =0and j = m switching roles.
Proposition 5 characterizes conditions on the asymmetry in the valuations
of the prize that are suﬃcient to make the tug-of-war evolve peacefully if it
starts in the symmetric state j = m/2.As u ﬃcient condition for this to
happen is that j = m
2 is not a tipping state. If tipping states are j0 and j0−1
with j0 − 1 >m / 2 then the equilibrium process moves from j = m
2 further
away from the tipping states towards the terminal state j =0 .I fZA <Z B,
and, hence, tipping states are j0 and j0 +1 ,w i t hj0 +1<m / 2, then the
equilibrium process moves further away from these states and towards the
terminal state j = m.
19Note that the number of states is irrelevant for whether the tug-of-war
that starts in state j = m
2 is resolved peacefully or not, provided that m>2.
Whether the tug-of-war is resolved peacefully or not depends only on the ratio
of the two prizes and the discount factor. For a given continuous distribution
of g, as the discount factor becomes large, the tug-of-war is resolved almost
surely peacefully.
Of course, oﬀsetting the potential gains from the tug-of-war in promoting
the peaceful resolution of resource contests are the potential costs of delay
arising from the multi-stage nature of the conﬂict. The all-pay auction is re-
solved in a single stage (m =2 )and hence reduces this delay to the minimum
attainable in a non-trivial contest. On the other hand, from Proposition 5
it is apparent that adding more states beyond m =4does not increase the
chance of peaceful resolution and only adds potential delay when a peaceful
outcome arises. Moreover, if m
2 is a tipping state, for a given draw of ZA and




2 max{(ZA − ZB),(ZB − ZA)} (24)
which is a strictly decreasing function in m. We state this as
Proposition 6 The sum of expected payoﬀs in the tug-of-war with m ≥ 4
w h i c hh a v eas y m m e t r i cs t a t em
2 is maximized at m =4 .
Using Proposition 5 we may compare the cases m =2and m =4 . When
m =4we know that there is a probability Γ(δ
2)+( 1− Γ(δ
−2)) that the
allocation is peaceful and a probability of Γ(δ
−2)−Γ(δ
2) that the allocation
is violent. We know that in the case m =2the allocation is always violent and
t h es u mo ft h ep l a y e r s ’p a y o ﬀsi sδ(Z(1) − Z(2)), where Z(1) ≡ max(ZA,Z B)
and Z(2) ≡ min(ZA,Z B). Ignoring discounting, the loss due to conﬂict, Z(2),
can be decomposed into the expected loss due to eﬀort expended, 1
2Z(2)[1 +
(Z(2)/Z(1))], and the expected loss due to misallocation of the prize, 1
2Z(2)[1−
(Z(2)/Z(1))]. The loss due to delay then comes when the factor δ is applied.
I nt h ec a s ew h e r em =4the allocation is peaceful when (Z(1)/Z(2)) >δ
−2.
In this case, starting from the state m
2 =2it takes two periods for the player
with the higher value to win and no eﬀort is expended. Hence, the sum of the
payoﬀs of the two players in this case is δ
2Z(1). The only ineﬃciency in this
case is due to delay. For realizations of (ZA,Z B) satisfying (Z(1)/Z(2)) >δ
−2,
t h et u g - o f - w a ri sm o r ee ﬃcient than the all-pay auction if and only if δ
2Z(1) >
20δ(Z(1) − Z(2)) or, equivalently, (Z(1)/Z(2)) < (1 − δ)−1. Since by assumption
we are in the range where the tug-of-war is peaceful, (Z(1)/Z(2)) >δ
−2. Note
that δ




2 . In this case, the all-pay auction is
more eﬃcient than the tug-of-war in this range of values of (Z(1)/Z(2)). For
δ>δ
+,δ
−2 < (1−δ)−1 and the tug-of-war is more eﬃcient than the all-pay
auction for values of (Z(1)/Z(2)) in the interval (δ
−2,(1−δ)−1) and the all-pay
auction is more eﬃcient for values of (Z(1)/Z(2)) in the interval ((1−δ)−1,∞).
When 1 ≤ (Z(1)/Z(2)) <δ
−2, in the tug-of-war the state m
2 is a tipping
state and the allocation involves active eﬀort expenditure. The expected sum
of the payoﬀs in this case can again be compared to those in the all-pay
auction. For m =4the expected sum of the payoﬀs in the tug-of-war can be
calculated from equation (24) and is equal to δ2
1−δ2(Z(1) − Z(2)). Comparing
this to the expected sum of payoﬀs in the all-pay auction we ﬁnd that for
Z(1) 6= Z(2), δ2
1−δ2(Z(1) − Z(2)) >δ (Z(1) − Z(2)) if and only if δ





2 . Therefore, when the realization of (ZA,Z B) is such that
the initial state m
2 is a violent state in the tug-of-war, the tug-of-war is more
eﬃcient than the all-pay auction when δ>δ
+ and the all-pay auction is
more eﬃcient than the tug-of-war when δ<δ
+.
We may summarize these results in the following proposition:




2 , for any realization of (ZA,Z B), the
all-pay auction (m =2 )is more eﬃcient than a tug-of-war with m =4 .W h e n
δ>δ
+ the tug-of-war with m =4is more eﬃcient than the all-pay auction
for (ZA,Z B) such that
Z(1)
Z(2) ∈ (1,(1 − δ)−1) and the all-pay auction is more
eﬃcient for
Z(1)
Z(2) ∈ ((1 − δ)−1,∞). In particular, for any given continuous
joint distribution of (ZA,Z B), for suﬃciently large δ the tug-or-war is more
eﬃcient than the all-pay auction.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
We studied the strategic behavior of players who compete in a series of single
battles. A prize is allocated as a function of the sequence of battle successes. A
suﬃcient lead in the number of battle victories is needed to win the ﬁnal prize.
We showed that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in Markov
strategies and we characterized this equilibrium. Contest eﬀort concentrates
on at most two states. Such states are characterized by three factors: the
21’distance’ which the two contestants need to win the overall contest, the
relative strength or dominance of contestants, and the discount factor. The
critical distance that determines the tipping states in which the contest eﬀort
is focussed turns out to be a function of the contestants’ relative strengths
(or, equivalently, in the relative valuations of the prize from ﬁnal victory)
and the discount factor. The larger one player’s dominance in strength, the
higher must be this player’s distance to ﬁnal victory, compared to the other
player’s distance.
Many animal species and economic institutions have developed mecha-
nisms such as hierarchies, or other organizational structures to govern the
allocation of prizes, such as preferential food access and the right to reprodu-
ce in the biological context, or prized jobs and contracts in the organizational
context. Behavior in these mechanisms could be interpreted as a conﬂict that
consists of a series of battles, or repeated opportunities to struggle. Our re-
sults help explain why these structures may have evolved. The tug-of-war
delays the allocation of a given prize, compared to a single stage conﬂict, but
can considerably increase the eﬃciency of allocation of the prize and reduce
the overall resources that are dissipated among the group of players.
5 Appendix





m−(j0−1)ZB.T h e nt h eM a r k o vp e r f e c t
equilibrium characterized in the Proposition 1 is unique in the class of Markov
perfect equilibria.
We will demonstate the uniqueness of continuation values for every state
j. For given state-contingent continuati o nv a l u e sw eh a v ea l r e a d ya r g u e dt h a t
the problem reduces to a standard all-pay auction for both players at each in-
terior state. Hence, uniqueness results from the uniqueness of the equilibrium
in the standard two-player all-pay auction with complete information.
Our proof will start by assuming that m ≥ 3 and j0 ∈ {2,...m−1}. (The
case of m =2corresponds trivially to the all-pay auction.) We claim the
following:
Claim 8 In any Markov perfect equilibrium, for all k ≤ j0 − 1, vB(k)=0
and for all k ≤ j0 − 2, vA(k)=δ
kZA.
22Proof. At k =0by construction vA(0) = ZA and vB(0) = 0, so the claim
holds for k =0 . Since ZA ≥ ZB and m ≥ 3,f r o m( 9 )e v a l u a t e da tk =2
it follows that J(0) = ZA > max(δ
2ZA,δ
m−2ZB) ≥ vA(2) + vB(2) = J(2).
Hence from (i) zA(1) >z B(1) and from (3) and (4) vA(1) = δ[ZA−vB(2)] and
vB(1) = 0. It immediately follows that J(1) = δ[ZA − vB(2)].T h i si m p l i e s
that the claim holds when j0 =2 , which by deﬁnition of j0 implies that
m =3 .
So assume that j0 ∈ {3,...m−1}. We will now prove the claim by induc-
tion on k. Suppose that for some k,1 ≤ k ≤ j0−2, vB(l)=0for all l ≤ k and
vA(l)=δ
lZA for all l ≤ k − 1. (Note that the supposition holds for k =1 )
We claim that vA(k)=δ
kZA and vB(k +1 )=0 .
To demonstrate this observe that by (5)
vA(k)=δvA(k+1)+max(0,δ[(vA(k−1)+vB(k−1))−(vA(k+1)+vB(k+1))])
Since vB(k)=0 , by (6) zB(k) − zA(k)=δ[(vA(k +1 )+vB(k +1 ) )−
(vA(k − 1) + vB(k − 1))] ≤ 0, which implies by (iii) that
vA(k)=δ[vA(k − 1) + vB(k − 1)) − vB(k +1 ) ]=δ[δ
k−1ZA − vB(k +1 ) ]
Moreover, vB(k+1)=δvB(k)+δmax(0,(vA(k+2)+vB(k+2))−(vA(k)+
vB(k))) = δmax(0,(vA(k +2 )+vB(k +2 ) )− δ[δ
k−1ZA − vB(k +1 ) ] ) .
Suppose by way of contradiction that vB(k +1 )> 0. Then vB(k +1 )=
δ[vA(k +2 )+vB(k +2 )− δ(δ
k−1ZA)+δvB(k +1 ) ]> 0,which implies that
vA(k +2 )+vB(k +2 )− δ
kZA =( δ
−1 − δ)vB(k +1 )> 0. However, by (9)
vA(k+2)+vB(k+2)≤ max(δ
k+2ZA,δ
m−(k+2)ZB).M o r e o v e r ,b yd e ﬁnition of
j0,δ
j0−1ZA >δ





m−(k+2)ZB.T h i si nt u r ni m p l i e st h a tvA(k +2 )+
vB(k +2 )≤ max(δ
k+2ZA,δ
m−(k+2)ZB) <δ
kZA,contradicting the claim that
vA(k+2)+vB(k+2)−δ
kZA =( δ
−1−δ)vB(k+1)> 0 Hence, vB(k+1)=0,
which immediately implies that vA(k)=δvA(k − 1) = δ
kZA.
This induction argument therefore shows for all k ≤ j0 − 1, vB(k)=0
and for all k ≤ j0 − 2,v A(k)=δ
kZA. An immediate consequence is that
vA(j0−1) = δ[(vA(j0−2)+vB(j0−2))−vB(j0)] = δ[δ
j0−2ZA−vB(j0)] (25)
23This equation will be used in the continuation to derive values at j0 −1 and
j0.
To address equilibrium behavior in states greater than or equal to j0,we
start in state m.N o t et h a ts i n c em is a terminal state vB(m)=ZB and
vA(m)=0 .If j0 = m − 1, then by deﬁnition δ
m−1ZA <δ Z B and δ
m−2ZA >
δ
2ZB. Moreover, by Claim 1 vB(m−2) = 0 and by (25) vA(m−2) = δ
m−2ZA−
δvB(m − 1). Hence,
vA(m − 1) = δvA(m)+δmax(0,v A(m − 2) + vB(m − 2) − vA(m) − vB(m))










m−(m−1)−1ZB = ZB. Hence, vA(m − 1) = 0. It follows that
vB(m−1) = δvB(m−2)+δmax(0,Z B−vA(m−2)−vB(m−2)) = δ(ZB−vA(m−2))
Hence,
vA(m − 2) = δ
m−2ZA − δvB(m − 1) and
vB(m − 1) = δ(ZB − vA(m − 2))
Solving simultaneously implies












where both inequalities follow from j0 = m − 1.
This completes the case for j0 = m − 1.S os u p p o s ej0 ∈ {3,...,m − 2}
and look at k>j 0.
Claim 9 In any subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary Markov strategies,
for all k ≥ j0,v A (k)=0and for all k ≥ j0 +1 ,v B(k)=δ
m−kZB.
24Proof. By an argument similar to that above, vB(m)=ZB and vA(m)=
0 imply J(m) >J(m−2), which in turn implies vA(m−1) = 0+δmax(0,J(m−
2) − ZB)=0 .
Suppose now that for some k, j0 +1≤ k<m , v A(l)=0for all l ≥ k
and vB(l)=δ
m−lZB for all l ≥ k +1 . We will now demonstrate that this
implies that vB(k)=δ
m−kZB and vA(k−1) = 0. Since the supposition holds
for k = m − 1, this will then prove claim 2 by induction.
So assume that for some k, j0 +1≤ k<m ,v A(l)=0for all l ≥ k
and vB(l)=δ
m−lZB for all l ≥ k +1 .S i n c evA(k)=0 , we know that
vA(k − 1) + vB(k − 1) − vA(k +1 )− vB(k +1 )≤ 0,s ot h a t
vB(k)=δvB(k − 1) + δmax(0,v A(k +1 )+vB(k +1 )− vA(k − 1) − vB(k − 1))
= δ[vA(k +1 )+vB(k +1 )− vA(k − 1)]
= δ[δ
m−(k+1)ZB − vA(k − 1)]
Moreover, vA(k−1) = δvA(k)+δmax(0,v A(k−2)+vB(k−2)−vA(k)−vB(k)).
Since vA(k)=0by assumption and vB(k)=δ
m−kZB − δvA(k − 1), we have
vA(k−1) = δmax(0,v A(k−2)+vB(k−2)−δ
m−kZB +δvA(k−1)). Suppose
by way of contradiction that vA(k − 1) > 0. Then
vA(k − 1) = δ[vA(k − 2) + vB(k − 2) − δ
m−kZB + δvA(k − 1)] > 0.
or
vA(k − 1)[δ
−1 − δ]=vA(k − 2) + vB(k − 2) − δ
m−kZB > 0.
where the last expression is greater than zero because δ<1.
However, from equation (9), vA(k−2)+vB(k−2) ≤ max(δ
k−2ZA,δ
m−k+2ZB).
Since k ≥ j0 +1implies k − 2 ≥ j0 − 1, and by deﬁnition of j0,δ
j0ZA <
δ
m−j0ZB,w ek n o wδ
j0−1ZA <δ









m−kZB, we have a contradiction to vA(k−2)+vB(k−2)−δ
m−kZB >
0. Hence, vA(k − 1) = 0. It immediately follows that vB(k)=δ
m−kZB.
We have hence showed by induction that for every k ≥ j0, vA(k)=0 and
for every k ≥ j0 +1 ,v B(k)=δ
m−kZB. An immediate consequence is that
vB(j0)=δvB(j0−1)+δmax(0,v B(j0+1)+vA(j0+1)−vA(j0−1)−vB(j0−1))
25Since vA(j0)=0implies J(j0 − 1) − J(j0 +1 )≤ 0, the maximand in the
expression is nonnegative and
(7) vB(j0)=δ[vB(j0 +1 )+vA(j0 +1 )− vA(j0 − 1)]
= δ[δ
m−(j0+1)ZB − vA(j0 − 1)]
Since from (25) vA(j0 − 1) = δ[δ
j0−2ZA − vB(j0)], we have a system of
two linearly independent equations in two unknowns. These have a unique
solution which is
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